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Summary findings
The public sector's share in wage employment is higher  A worker with a traditional farming background is
in Africa - including Ethiopia's urban labor market - more likely to be in the queue than is a second-
than in developed economies. Fuller unionization,  generation urban dweller. This is interesting, considering
greater job security, and more generous nonwage  that the influx of rural migrants to urban centers in the
benefits in the public sector lead one to assume that  last few decades has been partly fueled by hopes of
workers might queue up for public sector jobs. Do higher  public sector employment.
wage rates in Ethiopia's public sector create such a  On average, women are more likely than men, and
queue,  workers in provincial towns more likely than workers in
Mengistae extends Lee's two-stage structural probit  the capital, to prefer public sector jobs
analysis to test (with data from a recent urban household  Level of schooling and job experience do not seem to
survey) and measure the existence and scope of such a  affect preferences for the public over the private sector.
queue for public sector jobs in Ethiopia.  The probability of a worker's being selected from the
The results reject the absence of job rationing in favor  public sector job queue decreases with the wage rate the
of an implicit queue of most private sector workers for  worker potentially commands as a public sector
public sector jobs. The queue exists mainly because of  employee. Workers on the lower end of the pay scale are
popular expectations of a wage premium (between 11  more likely to be selected.
and 40 percent) in the public sector.  Among workers who join the queue for public sector
Controlling for individual differences in expectations  jobs, men are more likely to be hired than women  and
of the sectoral wage differences, Mengistae finds that  skilled workers are more likely to be hired than less-
skill does not significantly affect a worker's  sector  skilled workers.
preferences, but some social characteristics do.
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1  Introduction
The urban  labour  market  in Ethiopia  is typical  of those  in Africa and  rnany
other least developed countries in that  the share  of the public sector in wage
employment  is very high  compared  to  that  found  in developed  economies.'
Greater  degree of unionisation,  greater job security and what appears  to be a
more generous provision of non-wage benefits in the public sector are among
the  factors suggesting  that  at least  some private  workers may be  implicitly
queuing up for public sector jobs in the sense of preferring public sector em-
ployment  to their  current  status.  The main objective of this  paper  is to test
whether  or not  such a queue does indeed exist in the country  and to  measure
the  contribution  of sectoral  wage differentials in generating  or precluding  it.
Are public sector wage rates  competitive  enough to  support  a private  sector
wage premium  as a counterbalance  to  the tendency  of non-wage attractions
of public sector employment to produce  a queue?  Or, do higher public sector
wages in  fact  contribute  to  the  creation  of a queue?  This  is an  important
policy question  which, apart  from having a fiscal implication,  could bear on
'Over the period  1979-80, for instance,  the  public sector  employed  about  a third  of the
non-agricultural  labour  force in Africa  compared  to  a corresponding  figure  of under  ten
per cent  in OECD  countries  (Heller and  Tait,  1984).
1the influence of public sector pay policy on unemployment.2 In order  to  an-
swer it I shall extend  Lee's two-stage structural  probit  analysis  (Lee, 1979)
into a framework for testing  and  measuring the existence  and scope of a job
queue.  Lee's basic method  is based on a univariate  sorting  probit in the sec-
toral allocation  of workers and has been widely applied  in assessing the effect
of earning  differentials in the distribution  of individual's  between union  and
non-union jobs  (e.g., Lee, 1978), between self-employment and  wage employ-
ment  (e.g., Rees and Shah, 1986) and between the public and private  sectors
(e.g., Hartog  and Oosterbeek,  1993)3. However, an underlying  assumption  of
the method  is that,  given any one of the  three pairs of alternatives,  a worker
is always found in the sector where expected utility is higher.  As pointed  out
by Abowd and Farber  (1982), this will be the case only if the labour  market
being  investigated  clears.  If there  is excess demand  for jobs  in  one  of the
sectors,  the observed employment  status  of a worker depends  on employers'
job  rationing  rules  as well as the  worker's sector  preference.  A univariate
criterion probit  cannot, therefore,  be given structural  interpretation  in terms
of employee taste  alone  in  this  case.  The  dependent  variable  of the  indi-
cator  probit  is a product  of two  others  only one  of which  registers  worker
preferences.  The other indicates  whether  or not  a given worker satisfies the'
recruitment  criteria  of employers in the job  rationing  sector.  It follows that,
should  a worker be found outside of the latter,  it is not  necessarily the  case
that  he or she prefers the  other sector.  That  the  same worker is already  in
the preferred  sector is, of course, a possibility.  But  it is also possible that  he
or she has been rationed  out  of it.
A suggested  way out  of this  difficulty is to incorporate  the  recruitment
criteria  of employers  into  the  value  function  of workers  by  assuming  that
individuals  have full information on these criteria and take them  into account
in deciding whether  or not to queue for rationed  jobs.4 This would effectively
merge the criterion functions of workers and employers into one.  At the same
2See Stevenson  (1992)  for a discussion  of the fiscal  and growth  implications  of public
sector  pay and employement  policy  in a developing  country  context. Lindauer  (1991)  sets
out conditions  under which  public sectror  wage premiums  may lead to a higher  rate of
open unemployment.
30ther  studies  of  public-  versus-  private  sector  wage  differentials  in developed  economies
and based  on the Heckman-Lee  procedure  of adjusting  for  selectivity  bias are Shapiro  and
Stelcner  (1989)  for Canada,  Van Ophem  (1991)  for the Netherlands,  Hundley  (1991)  and
Choudhury  (1994)  for the USA  and Dustman  and Van Soest (1995)  for Germany.
4See,  for example,  Lee  (1978)  and Van der Gaag and Vijverberg  (1988).
2time  it would allow us to  interpret  the  resulting  univariate  sorting  probit  as
an  expression  of a utility  maximising  labour  supply  decision.  The  trouble
with  this  approach  is  that,  in  the  present  context,  'queuing  up'  is not  a
costly decision but  a state  of preference.5 The only acceptable  way in which
a univariate  criterion  function can be interpreted  as an expression of worker
preferences  seems, therefore,  to  assume  away a job  queue.  However, this  is
an extreme  restriction  on the  model, being no more justified  a priori  than
the  other extreme  of a universal queue for rationed  jobs.
One way of avoiding either  of these restrictions  is to replace the univariate
criterion probit of Lee's basic model by Poirier's  (1980) bivariate probit  with
partial  observability.  Apart  from providing a basis for testing  the  existence
and  coverage of a job queue, this enables us to consistently  estimate  the pro-
portion  of workers whose choice of sector is constrained.  The proportion  is
a useful  indicator  of the  degree  of job  rationing  in  the  market  of interest.
That  we can estimate  it at  all is remarkable  since the preference  of workers
outside of the job rationing  sector is not observable.  Although  the  idea of an
endogenous  switching model based on Poirier's  probit  is not  newv,  this is the
first  attempt  at its implementation  as an extension  of Lee's two-stage struc-
tural  probit  analysis.6 The  two-stage  probit  analysis  employed  here yields
less efficient parameter  estimates  than  the  single step  maximumn likelihood
' An example of situations in which 'queuing up'  is a costly option is the case of an
unemployed worker faced with the choice between immediately taking up a job in sector
A and remaining umemployed as a strategy for enhancing the prospect of getting a job
in a preferred sector B in the future.  Here, the probability of actually getting a job in B
at any given date is part of the information the worker needs to determine the certainity
equivalent of the net gain from joining the queue for jobs in sector B. However,  this clearly
is not the case of a worker who, for example, is employed in a non-union job but would
rather be in a unionised  job. A worker's desire for a union job or the lack of it does depend
on the attributes  of union and non-union jobs including a possible union wage premium.
However,  it should have no more  to do with the worker's perceived  chance of'  being selected
by union employers  than a consumer's preference ordering over a range of goods has to do
with his or her means.
6The idea was first raised by Abowd and Farber (1982) and subsequentl;y  implemented
by Venti (1988), to model the allocation of US workers between the private sector and
federal employment. Heywood and Mohanty (1994) estimate reduced form parameters of
a federal job queue in the US, but stop short of obtaining structural paramieter estimates
and do not, consequently,  assess  the role of wage differentials  in generating or precluding a
queue. Kreuger (1988) presents evidence  that preference  for federal  jobs in the US depends
largely on expected wage premiums without,  however, estimating  a sectoral allocation
model.
3estimation  of the  same model as is done in Venti  (1988). However, it is also
far easier to implement  unless we have recourse to highly restrictive  assump-
tions of the kind used by Venti. These include the assumptions  that  rationed
jobs  are life time jobs  and  that  human  capital  variables  are correlated  with
sector preferences entirely through  their  effects on earning potential.
Previous  studies of the role of pay differentials in the allocation  of workers
between  the  public  and  private  sectors  of economies with  a  state  of devel-
opment  similar  to  that  of Ethiopia  include,  Lindauer  and  Sabot  (1983) on
Tanzania,  Van der  Gaag  and Vijverberg  (1988) on Cote d'Ivoire  and  Terrel
(1993) on Haiti.  The first  of these  suffers from  its  failure  to  deal  with  the
sample selection problem  that  arises  in the  estimation  of sectoral  wage dif-
ferentials.  The  second  is an  application  of the  univariate  structural  probit
method  and is, therefore, subject  to this paper's  criticism of a univariate  spec-
ification of the  switch between sectoral  wage regimes.  The third  study  does
not depend  on the estimation  a structural  switching function.  However, it is
based  on the  estimation  of conditional  wage functions  the  selectivity  terms
of which imply a univariate  probit  specification of the switch between  public
sector  and private  sector employment.  As pointed  out  in Poirier  (1980) and
Farber  (1983), the  misspecification of a bivariate  probit  switching  equation
as a simple probit  creates  an  omitted-variable  problem  in the  estimation  of
the  conditional  wage functions.
The  paper  is organised  as follows.  The  model,  its  estimation  and  test
procedures  are  discussed  in  Section  2.  Empirical  Results  are reported  in
Section 3.  Section 4 is summary  and  conclusion.
2  The  Model,  Estimation  and  Tests
2.1  The  Model
The  population  of interest  consists  of full-time  employees of private  firms
and the public sector.  Let Wli be the hourly wage an individual  i, randomly
selected from this  population,  would earn as a public sector worker.  Let W2i
be what  the same individual  would earn in the private  sector.  Denote by Uli
the maximum utility  the individual would attain  in the public sector, and by
U2i the corresponding utility  in the private  sector.  Denote also Vli =  Uli-U2i
. We say that  i  prefers  public sector  employment  to  working for  a private
firm if and only if Vli > 0 . As is customary  in the  literature,  I assume that
4Vli is linear  in the  public sector's  wage premium,  ln Wli  - in  W2i,  and  a set
of observable characteristics,  Zli, of i  . We can then  write:
Vii =  a,  (In Wli  - In W2i) + Zliyl  + Uli  (1)
where  a,  is  a constant,  'yl  is a  vector  of parameters  including  a  constant
term  and  uli is a random  error term  distributed  normal with  mean zero and
variance  u  2
Let Ili be a dichotomous variable such that  Ili =  1 if Vli > 0 , and Ili =  0,
otherwise.  The  variable Vli is not  observable for any i.  Howevrer,  I  assume
that  Ili  is unity  for public  sector workers.  In contrast,  we do not  know the
value of Ili for any one in the  private  sector.
Equation  2.1 determines  the  queuing  status  of i  with  respect  to  public
sector employment.  Following Abowd and Farber  I will call it the  'in-queue'
or  IQ function  of the  model.  It  divides the  population  into  two mutually
exclusive groups G1 and G2 such that  i E G1 if and only if Ili =  1 and i E G2
if and  only if Ili  =  0 . Let the  cost,  to  the public  sector,  of ernploying any
i E G 1 be Cli . I shall assume that  Cli = Wli + Bli ,where  Bli  is hourly  non-
wage pecuniary  benefits.  I assume  also that  a public sector employer has no
discretion  in the determination  of Cli . This is in the sense that,  once i E GI
is in the  public  sector,  Cli  is, on  average,  what  government  compensation
rules prescribe  it to  be  given the  observable characteristics  of i  . However,
it is entirely  up to  individual  public sector  employers to  decide as to which
workers in G,  are to be recruited  subject  to the same compensation  rules.  I
further  assume that  each public sector employer behaves as a cost minimiser
in making this  decision.  Let Mli  be the  hourly  marginal  value product  of i
in the public sector.  A cost minimising recruitment  decision implies that  i is
actually  in the public  sector if and  only if E(MlilV1i  > 0) > E(Cli|V1i  > 0)
. To simplify, let In Cli be linear in ln Wli.  Assume also that  In Mli  is linear
in a set of observable characteristics  Z 2 i  of i . Denoting  V 2i = In Mli  - ln C
,we can write:
V2i  =  Ce 2 E(ln  Wli Vii  >  0)  +  Z24y 2 +  U2i,
i  E  G1  (2)
where,  a2  is a  constant,  72  is a vector  of parameters  including  a  constant
term  and u2i is a random  error term  distributed  normal  with zero mean and
2 variance aU2
5Any individual  i  E G1 is chosen from  the  queue  if and  only  if V 2i  >  0
Let  I2i  be  a second  indicator  variable  such that  I2i  =  1 if  V 2i  >  0 ,and
I2i  =  0 otherwise.  Equation  2.2 is what  Abowd  and  Farber  would call the
'chosen-from  the  queue'  or  CFQ  function  of the  model.  It  further  divides
workers in  G1 into  two  distinct  subgroups  Gll  and  G12 such that  i  E  GI
is in Gll  if and  only if I2i  =  1 and  i  E  G1 is in  G12 if and  only  if I2i  =  0.
The IQ and CFQ functions together  segment the entire population  into three
mutually  exclusive groups,  namely:  (1) public  sector  workers, i.e., those  in
Gll;  (2) private  sector workers that  are in the  queue for public  sector jobs,
i.e., those in G12; and  (3) private  sector workers who are not  in the queue for
public sector jobs,  i.e., those  in G2. The sorting  of the  population  between
the private  and public sectors can, of course, be described by a simple probit
with  a fully observable  indicator  variable  Ii  such that  It =  1 if i  is in  the
public sector and  Ii = 0 if i is in the private  sector.  However, it is clear that
Ii =  '1i 12i if i E GC and  Ii = Ili,  otherwise.  This means  that  given that  i is
observed in the  public sector or that  Ii = 1, we can always infer that  Ili  =  1
and  12i  =  1.  The  problem  is that  we cannot  draw  a  similarly  categorical
conclusion from observing 1i = 0. All that  we can infer from observing that  i
is actually  in the private  sector is that,  either  the worker is not in the  queue
for a public  sector job  (i.e., Ili  =  0),  or is in the  queue,  but  has  failed to
be selected  by employers  (i.e., Ili  =  1 and  I2i =  0).  Equations  2.1 and  2.2
describe  the  sorting  process  as  Poirier's  probit  by way of overcoming  this
ambiguity of the observation  Ii = 0.  Because of the conditioning  of equation
2.2 on the  IQ function,  the  error  term  u2 i  is distributed  independently  of
The  ideal  specification  of the  sorting  process is a  bivariate  probit  with
full observablity, since this  would lead to more efficient parameter  estimates.
Unfortunately  it is impossible to observe the IQ and CFQ status  of all workers
at the  same time  from survey  data.  The use of Poirier's  probit  is a way of
making  up  for this  lack of information  by exploiting  the  fact that  a worker
is observed  in  the  public  sector  if and  only  if the  worker  wants  to  and,  at
7This has the advantage of simplifying estimation without ruling out the possibility
that  the error term of the unconditional public sector 'job offer' function underlying the
CFQ function is correlated with uli.  Its disadvantage (Maddala, 1983) is that we cannot
make inferences about the unconditional job offer function itself unless we assume that
the latter  is independent of the IQ function.  Note, though, that  the assumption is not
as restrictive as is sometimes suggested.  This is because no economic meaning can be
attached to the correlation between  job offers and IQ status as long as queuing is costless.
6the  same  time,  satisfies  employers'  selection  criteria.  The  essence  of the
method  is to  match  the  characteristics  of workers in the  public  sector with
those  of workers in  the  private  sector,  having  distinguished  first  the  set  of
characteristics  that  influence Pr(Ii  =  I) through  their  effect on the IQ status
from the  set  of characteristics  that  influence the  same probability  through
their  effect on the  CFQ status.
Equations  2.1 and 2.2 belong to a system I close by the following sectoral
wage functions:
ln Wli  =  Xi,B3 + v1i
if Vli  >  O,  V2i  > O  (3)
and
lnW2 i  =  X02  +  V2i,
otherwise  (4)
where,  Xi  is a vector  of worker and  industry  characteristics,  /l  and  02  are
parameter  vectors,  vli  is iid normal  with  mean  zero and  variance  or  2  and
v2i is distributed  likewise but  with variance o,2. I will denote the covariance
between uli and  v1i  by (7vi,  the covariance between uli and  v2i  by ClV2 ,  the
covariance between  u2i and  vli by 
0 2v, and  the  covariance between  u 2.i and
v2i  by 
0
2V2.  Let  w  =  (uli, u2 , vli, v2)  and  denote  the  covariance  matrix,
E (ww')  , of the disturbance  terms of the model by E  . We have
2  0  O
7
1v 1 1 o*U1  °:1v  CV
O2 0'2vi  U2V2
=  aU~~~~C2  C2V  122
V2
2.2  Estimation
Using equations  2.1 and 2.3, we have
E(ln WliIVii >  0) = Xj,31 +  ± alAli  (5)
where Ali =  [  [E (V1 i/aul)]  /4  [E (Vii/au,)],  X (.) is the standard  normEd pdf
and 4) (.) is the standard  normal cdf.  Substituting  equations  2.3 and  2.4 into
2.1, dividing through  by v  and rearranging  gives
= Xic* ± Z1 +-'4  + ul,  (6)
7where,  Ili  =  [Vli  - Cl (vli  - v 2i)] /U,  all =  (a°/ola)  (03  - 12),  Y1  =  YI/u 1
and u*i = u1i/a,ui. Substituting 2.5 into 2.2, dividing  through by 0u2  and
rearranging  gives
2*i =  *i02  +  Z2iY2* +  U*2i(7 ,2i  Xia  ~~~~~~~~~~~7)
where, I2*i  = (V2i  - a2A 1 )  /u2!,  a*  =  (a2/ou 2 )  1,  =  -Y1/0u 2 and u*2  =
The sectoral wage equations can then be written as
In  W1i  =  Xi31 + v1i
if I*i  >  a,(V2i - Vli) and 12*i > - A- 1 (8)
Cu1  O'u2
and
In W2i  =  Xi,B 2 + v2i,
otherwise.  (9)
Equations 2.6 to 2.9 constitute the reduced form of the system of equations
2.1 to  2.4.  Let cl  =  (L',-yf)  ,  c2 =  (C*, 7'),  Zli  =  [Xi,Z 1 i] and Z2i  =
[Xi, Z2i]  . As shown in Poirier (1980) both  c 1 and c2 are identified as long
as at least  one variable in Z1i is excluded  from Z2 i or vice versa.  It is clear
from equations  2.6 and 2.7 that  this  condition  is met  if at least  one variable
in  Zli is excluded  from Z2i  or vice versa.  Indeed,  I shall assume  that  Z2 i is
a proper  subset  of Zli,  that  is, all individual  characteristics  that  influence
the  IQ status  also affect the  CFQ  status  while the  converse is not  true.  In
particular,  I shall assume that  family background  variables  affect a worker's
IQ status  but have no influence on the probability  of the worker being selected
by public sector employers either  directly or through  their  effect on the cost
of employing the  worker.
Given cl, Lee (1979) has shown that  both a* and -4  are identified only if at
least  one variable  exogenous variable  in Xi is excluded  from Z1i.  Similarly,
a  necessary  condition  for  the  identification  of both  a!  and  -y* from  c2 is
that  at  least  one  variable in Xi  is excluded  from Z2i  .'  I shall use industry
specific job attributes  as means of identification  in this  context,  by excluding
them  from both  Z1i and  Z2i.  The  underlying  assumption  is that  while the
same attributes  are important  in wage determination  in either  sector,  they
have no direct  influence either  on the  IQ probability  or the CFQ probability.
Given c* and  a*  , the sample separation  property  of the model ensures that
both  ,13 and  02  are identified.  This guarantees  that  cl/ol  and  a2/Uu 2 are
8also identified.  The parameters  o,  v2)  u2  /lvj/Ul,  UIV 2/aul,  U2v /UU25 and
U2V 2/cYU 2 are identified,  again because of sample separation. However,  sample
separation also means that  a12 cannot be identified from the reduced form
of the model. We cannot identify either a2  and au2, which means that  cai,
a 2 and the covariances  between the error terms of the sorting equations and
those of the wage functions can be identified only up to division by au. or
aU2  as the  case may be.  I shall therefore  use the normalisation  or  21 =  0r2  =  1
through out the rest of the paper.
Let V  li = Zlic,  and 
4 2i  =  Z2iC2  *  Using the normalisation  u, =  O  =  1
the likelihood functions of the reduced form equations (2.6) to  (2.9) is
L (e)  i)  H21 (UlijV2i) H22 (U2ijV2i)  92  (V2i)  dUlidU2i
-oo  -oo
x  |  J  Hll  (ulilvli)  H12  (u 2iIvli)  91 (Vii)  dUlidu2i  (10)
-02i -Oli




1v2,  a2v,  a  2v 2 )I  N is sample
size, Hjm(j,  j,m = 1, 2 is the normal pdf of Urni  conditional on vji, and gj (.)
is the marginal pdf of vji. Although maximisation of 2.10 would yield consis-
tent and asymptotically efficient  estimates of the parameters in E, it is not
attempted here. Instead I use that fact that  the properties of the two stage
structural probit analysis of Lee (1979)  readily extend to the case of a maodel
with two but independent switching  rules. The first stage of the method con-
sists in using probit maximum likelihood  estimates cj and &2 of the parame-
ters c1 and c2 of the reduced form IQ and CFQ functions  to obtain consistent
estimates (31 of the parameters e9  =  (i31,  y2,  vl  Uv2 alvll  O'lv 2, 
0 a2vl  £72v2)
through the Heckman-Lee  modified least squares estimation of the sectoral
wage equations.  In the  second stage, estimates of a1,  a2,  'rl  and  'Y2  are
obtained by maximum likelihood  from the probits
V1li =  Xi  (5l1-  2)  Ce  +  Zli-Yl  +  "li  (1 1)
and
V2*i  =  ±XA  +  1viAli)  C2 +  Z2iY 2 +  U2 i  (12)
where, i1i  =  uli+Xi  (i1  - 1)  +Xi  (02  - /2)  and U2i =  u2 i+Xi  (il-,  +
OlV  A  li- &lV Ali. Note that the disturbance term of each of these equations is
9asymptotically  standard  normal which follows from the  standard  normality
of uli  and  U2i and  the  consistency  of Bl  ,02  and  &iv1Aii. The  need for the
second stage arises from the fact that,  although  ca and a2 are both  identified,
a unique solution of either cannot  be obtained  form El and  &2 since the model
is overidentified.  By a theorem  due to Lee (1979, pp.986-88), the consistency
of the two stage estimators  - 1,Q 2,.^y 1 and '2  follows from the  consistency  of
/1,  02,  &hl,  and  Ali and the rank  condition  for the identification  of cl and c2
. Obtaining  consistent  estimates  of 31, 02  and ol  Al, is therefore  the  main
task  in the estimation  of the model.
We have from equation  2.8 that
E  (vii$Ili =  1, I2i  =  1) =  UlvlAli  +  U2v1A2i  (13)
where Ali =  (Zlicl) /.'  (Zl i cl) and A2i  =  0 (Z2 c 2 )  /.  (Z 2 iC2)  . Least
squares  estimation  of equation  2.8 on  any  sample  of public  sector  workers
will not,  therefore,  yield a consistent  estimate  of 01 unless crlv  =  U2v 1 =  0
If the  error terms of the IQ and  CFQ functions happen  to  be correlated  with
li , unbiased  least squares estimation  of 31 requires the  specification,
lnWli  =  Xi3l  +  Ulv Ali + U2v 1 A 2i +  Eli  (14)
where,
Eli  =  lii  - CVAl  - 02vlA2i  (15)
so that  E(elilIi  =  1) = 0 . However, 2.14 cannot  be estimated  directly  since
Ali and  A2i  are unknown.  The Heckman-Lee modified least squares procedure
for consistent  estimation  of i1  consists in the  application  of OLS to
In Wli =  Xi/l  +  r,,,A1li +  92v,A 2i + 7li  (16)
where,
?77i  =  Eli +  Ol1vi  (Ali  - Ali)  +  U2v,  (A2i  - A2i) '  (17)
A1,  Q  (Z1 iC^)  /4  (Zlija 1)  ) A2i =  0  (Z2iA2)  /4)  (7Z2 ia^)  and  &j and  &2  are
probit  maximum  likelihood estimates  of cl and  c2 respectively.
The conditional wage equation  of the private  sector is not as readily iden-
tifiable since we do not  observe the  queuing status  of this  group of workers.
For private  sector  workers that  are not  in  the  queue for public  sector jobs,
the  conditional  wage equation  is
ln W2(i  =  XiO2 +  o1l, 2A3i + E2i
i  E  G2 (18)
10where, A 3 & =  - (Zlicl)  /  [I - '  (71ic1)]  and 421i)  =  V2i  - Ulv2,N3i  n  I  con-
trast,  the  conditional  wage equation  for private  sector  workers that  are in
the queue for public sector jobs is
In W2(i=  Xi 2 +  O1i 2AIi +  07 2V2A4i +  2
i  C  )G12
where,  A4i =-  (Z2ic2)  /  [1  - i  (Z2iC2)1  and  e2i  =v 2i  - Olv 2 A1 i  +  02v 2A4i
. However, consistent  estimation  of  02  by the  Heckman-Lee  method  does
not require  knowledge of the  distribution  of private  sector  worlkers between
groups G12 and  G2 . Let the proportion  of private  sector workers who would
rather  be  in the  public sector  be  ir . Then  the  expected  wage of a worker
randomly  drawn from the sub population  of private sector employees is given
by (1 - 7r)  E  (In W2(IP)  +7rE  (In W2(i)) . This leads to the overall private sector
conditional wage equation
'n W2i  =  Xi3 2 +  1U2A3i +  611Ai  +  62A4i +  E2i
i  [G 2uG12]  (20)
wghere, E2i  =  7r-T)  c)1  +  7rE 22),  A*  =  Ali-  A3i,  61 = 
7tUlv 2 and 62  =  7f2V2*
Consistent  estimates  of 02,  clV2,  61 and  62 are obtained  by applying  least
squares  to
ln W2i = XiO2 +  U1 12A3i +  * 1 A 1i + 62A4i + n72i  (21)
where  A3i  =  -X  (z 1Ai) /  [1 - (D  (ZliFl)],  A  =li  -A i
=  -X  (Z2iA2) / [1-i  (Z2i-2)] and
772i =  E2i  +  UlV2 (Ai  - A3i)  + 61  li - ) + 62 (N4 i - 4i)  (22)
Although  least squares applied to equations  2.16 and 2.21 gives consistent
estimates  of B1, Q 2,  alUl  O'vl2,2v1,  0
72V2  and  7r  ,  it  is clear  form  equations
2.17 and 2.22, that  the corresponding least squares estimates  of the standard
errors  of the  same parameter  estimates  are inconsistent  as are least squares
estimates  of o-2  and o2  Consistent  estimates  of o2  and uv2  can, however, vi  V2  V
be obtained  based  on Tallis  (1961) and  Amemiya  (1974).  Let  var(elilIJ  =
1) =  E  (El2 II =  1)  =  Or2 . Then equation  2.15 implies
2  a2  or-2Ali  ((li  +  Ali)  - 2V  A  +  (23) ,  VI  lvil  +~)  2v1 2i (4'2i  A2i1
11Let rji be the  jth  residual of the least squares estimation  of 2.16.  By equation
2.17  q  2i  is the  probability  limit  of E  2 . A  consistent  estimator  of o2  is,
therefore,
o,  =  N  (7±1ii)  (24)
where  N1 is the size of the  subsample  of public sector workers,
&2=  &l2tji  ('li  +  Li) +  &-2v, 1 2i  (+2i  +  A2i)
.21 and  2vl  are least squares estimates  of u2vj and  u2vj  respectively,  ji= anl  2  a=elestsqan  U2vii 
Z1ijl  and 
4 2i  =  Z20c2-  Similarly, let Var(e 2ili  =  0)  E2i.  It  can be shown
that
¢{22i  =  OV2-(1-  )  - 10 1 V2 A  (Vli  +  A3i)]
7r2  [0, 2 1 i  ('li  + Ali) +  ,2 2 A4 i  ('2i  + A4i)]
+2 (1 - ir)  7T  [o1 V 2A3 & (OlV 2AAli+  ±2V2 A4i)]  (25)
A consistent  estimator  of or2 is
-2  1  N2
JV2 =N  (?2i  + d2i)  (26)
where N2 is the size of the sub-sample of private  sector workers, ~2i iS the  ith
least squares  residual of equation  2.21 and
=(1-r)2  [l1V 2A3i (+li  +
+7T  i  V  +  +  2v2  A4i  (-li  +  ±4i
-2  (1 - r) e [&1v2  3i  (&lV2  L  +  & 2V2 A4 i)  ]
The  asymptotic  standard  errors  of parameter  estimates  of 2.16 can  be
obtained  using 2.24 based on Ham  (1982). The latter  extends  the Lee et a.l
(1980) correction to the case of a dual source of selectivity.  Further  extension
to obtain  the  correct  covariance matrix  of the  private  sector  wage equation,
2.21 is straightforward  and is based  on the first  order  approximation
2i  t  E2i  +  1 Ovl9g(c-  ^)  +  61i  (C-C)  +  62g4i  (C-  (27)
12where,  g3i =  0A 3i/&C,  *  =  8li/oc  and  g4i =  9A4i/9C  are  gradient  vec-
-I tors,  c'  =  [c 1,c2]  and  c  - [c^ 1,c^ 2].  Let  X2 i  =  (/v3iAi>4)  2  =
[32v,01v2,61,A2],  X2 =  (X2 1,X 2 2 ,...,X 2 N2),  7l2  =  (7721 r22,  -712NO2  ),  =
(E21,  E2 2, ...,  E2N 2) , G2i  =  01v293i  +  6191i  +  6294i  and  G2 =  (  ?21,  22, ... , G2N2)
Then
- 2  =  2)  X2?712
(2  + G2 (c2-  (28)
where,  /2  =  (a2  l  &vl,v  61, 62)  is  the  least  squares  estimate  of  '3 2.It can be
shown that  E [(c  -c)  e 2] =  0 so that
var (X2)  =(X'2X)1  [X2QX2]  (X2X2)  (29)
where  Q  =  var(e 2 )  +  G2var(F)G2  and  var(e 2)  =  Diag(a  2ci) . Let  G 2 be
our estimate of G 2 obtained  by replacing  A3i, A*i and  \4i by Ai,  A 1i and  A 4i
respectively.  Then the variance of !B2 is consistently  estimated  by
far  (p)=(X2X2  [X2QX2] (;X2'2)  (30)
where Q =  Diag(2i)  + G2iar(a)G 2 .
2.3  Testing  For A Job  Queue
The parameter  7r in equation  2.21 is the proportion  of private  sector workers
who have been rationed  out of the public sector and can be estimated  consis-
tently  since it is identified in the same equation.8 The existence or otherwise
of a public  sector job  queue can be tested  on the basis  of the  first stage  es-
timation  of the  reduced  form IQ and  CFQ  probits,  which  is the  procedure
used  by Abowd  and  Farber(1982).  In the  absence  of a  queue the  reduced
form  of the  switch between  private  and public  sector jobs  is given by equa-
tion  2.6, which is obtained  by the  restriction  that  all the  elements of c2 are
8I estimate  7r  by  ir =  1/a1,,2  the  consistency  of which  follows  from  that  of  -61  and  al,V2
by Slutsky's  Theorem.
13zero with the exception of the constant  term which now assumes an arbitrary
positive number  large enough to ensure that  pr  (12i  =  1lIli =  1) = 1 for all i.
The opposite of this  'no queue' scenario is the case of a 'universal job  queue'
where, the reduced  form the sorting  mechanism is described by equation  2.7.
A universal queue is equivalent to the restriction  on 2.6 and  2.7 that  all the
elements of cl are zero except for the constant  term which is now an arbitrary
positive  number large enough to  ensure that  pr(Iii  =  1) =  1 for all i.  I will
refer to  the likelihood ratio  test  of either  restriction  as Abowd and  Farber's
test  for a job  queue to  distinguish  it from  an alternative  test  based  on the
estimates  of the conditional  private sector wage equation.  The latter  is based
on the fact that  the no-queue model implies that  7r =  0 while a universal job
queue model means ir =  1. A rejection  of both  the no-queue and the univer-
sal queue restrictions  implies a regime of a partial  job queue, in which some
but  not  all private  sector  workers are  in the  queue for  a public  sector job,
that  is, one in which 0 <  7r < 1. I will refer to  the  unrestricted  model,where
O  <  7r <  1, as 'the  queue'  model.  The  asymptotic  joint  significance test  of
51 and  62 is a test  of the null 7r  =  0. Similarly, the  asymptotic  F-test  of the
restriction  oy1V2  =  61 is a test  of the  null  7r  =  19.  It  should  be  noted  that
the conditional  wage equation  2.21 can be interpreted  as a compound model
nesting the no-queue and universal queue specifications of equations  2.18 and
2.19, with 7r  as the analogue to the nesting parameter  of the J -test  (Davidson
and  Mackinnon,  1982).  The  difference between  the  standard  J-test  setting
and the present  case is that  the,  7r here is not  an artificial nesting  device but
a parameter  of economic meaning.  Because all its parameters  are identified,
the general model  in our case is also directly estimable,  without  the  need to
first  estimate  either  special  case.  With  this  caveat  in  mind  I will refer to
tests  of the no-queue and the universal  queue models based on equation  2.21
as the  J-test  for a job  queue.  Since there  is no guarantee  that  the two tests
yield the  same result  in  any particular  sample,  outcomes  of both  tests  will
be reported  in the next  section.
9As shown by Ahn  (1992), the approximate  F-statistic  of a model with a dual  selection
mechanism  is asymptotically  equivalent  to the  LM test  statistic.
143  Empirical  Results
3.1  Data  and  Variables
The  data  analysed  consist  of observations  on  1170 individuals  who worked
as full-time wage employees of private  firms and  public sector organisations
in  Ethiopia's  major  towns  in  1994.  These were drawn  from  the  1994 wave
of the SSUH survey as a subsample obtained  by eliminating  individuals  who
were out  of the labour  force, unemployed,  self-employed or worked as casual
or part-time  workers or as domestic workers at the time of the survey.C'O  Just
over 63 per  cent of those  in the  sample were public sector employees  at the
time of the survey, which is similar to figures reported  for many other African
countries.
The  dependent  variable  of the  estimated  wage equations  is the  natural
logarithm  of hourly  wages in  Birr."  The  set  of variables,  Xi,  inclucled in
the public  sector wage equation  are the same as those include  in the  private
sector equation  although  this  is not  a requirement  of the model.  Descriptive
statistics  of the relevant variables  are given in Table 3.1.  Standard  earnings
function regressors are denoted  as follows:
EDUC  = number  of years of schooling;
EXPR  =  age minus 6 minus years of schooling, measuring  potential  mar-
ket experience;
EXPRSQ  = the  square of EXPR;
TENURE  =  number  of years in the  current job;
TENURESQ  =  square of TENUER.
The  remaining  variables  in  Xi  are  all dichotomous  and  are  defirled as
follows:
GENDER  =  1 if the  worker is male;
NONADDIS=  1 if the worker resides in a regional urban  centre,  i.e., in a
town other  than  the capital;
' 0The main reason for the exclusion of domestic workers from the sample was that in-
kind payments in the form of food and lodging  are typically a very large proportion o:f  wages
for the group in Ethiopia at the moment. This means that  a dummy variable wou].d  have
to be included for the group in the estimation of the private sector wage equation to avoid
the measurment error that would otherwise arise.Unfortunately the same variable cannot
appear in the reduced form sorting probits since it would be collinear to the indicator
variables which makes estimation impossible.
" 1The  Birr is Ethiopia's currency. It's  official  exchange rate to the US dollar stood at
Birr 6.5 at the time of the survey.
15Table  1: Descriptive  Statistics.
Public Sector  Private Sector  All Workers
Variable  Mean  Standard  Mean  Standard  Mean  Standard
deviation  deviation  deviation
LNWAGE  0.62  0.74  0.12  0.99  0.44  0.88
EDUC  10.26  4.18  7.33  4.72  9.18  4.61
EDUCSQ  122.75  74.36  75.96  73.04  105.51  77.22
EXPR  20.22  11.46  19.05  14.73  19.79  12.76
EXPRSQ  539.91  569.98  579.18  805.83  554.38  666.57
TENURE  11.83  8.82  6.46  8.33  9.85  9.02
TENURESQ  217.54  270.22  110.91  249.54  178.26  267.68
GENDER  0.61  0.49  0.74  0.44  0.66  0.48
NONADDIS  0.40  0.49  0.24  0.43  0.34  0.47
PROFTECH  0.28  0.45  0.13  0.33  0.22  0.42
ADMCLER  0.23  0.42  0.16  0.37  0.21  0.40
FATOVWNAC  0.15  0.35  0.13  0.34  0.14  0.35
FATPRWAG  0.03  0.18  0.12  0.32  0.06  0.25
FATPUWAG  0.21  0.41  0.15  0.36  0.19  0.39
FOODBEV  0.04  0.21  0.04  0.19  0.04  0.20
OTHINDUS  0.06  0.25  0.19  0.39  0.11  0.31
OTHMANU  0.16  0.36  0.19  0.39  0.17  0.38
Number of obs.  739  431  1170
PROFTECH  =  1 if the worker's main occupation  is professional or tech-
rical;
ADMCLER  =  1 if the  worker has not  been trained  as a professional or
technical  worker but  mainly  does an administrative  or clerical work;
FOODBEV  1 if the worker is employed in the food or beverages indus-
tries;
OTHMANU  =  1 if the  worker is employed  in a manufacturing  industry
other  than  the  food and beverages industries;
OTHINDUS  = 1 if the worker is employed in a non-service, non-manufacturing
industry.
Although  the  market  experience  of the  average public  sector  worker  is
comparable  to  that  of the  average  private  sector  employee,  public  sector
workers have twice as many years of tenure  over the  current job  at  12 years
as private  sector workers. The average public sector worker is also better  ed-ucated  than the average private  sector employee. The mean level of schooling
for the  full sample is 9 years, which compares to a figure of 10.3 years in the
public sector  and  7.3 years in the  private  sector.  The proportion  of women
in the work force is also much higher in the public sector at just  under  forty
per  cent against  a figure of 26 per cent in the private  sector.  Turning  to the
breakdown  of work force by occupational  groups, we see that  more than  half
of public  sector workers do professional/technical  or administrative  or cleri-
cal jobs  against  a 28 per  cent share  of the same groups in the private  sector.
Two thirds  of public sector workers also work in service industries  which is
twice the  figure in the private  sector.  The proportion  of workers engaged in
the  fooL or  beverages industries  is similar  for the two  sectors.  However, a
much higher  proportion  of the  work force is engaged  in the  manufacturing
and  other non-service industries  in the private  sector than  is the case in the
pubLic sector.  I finally  note  that  only  40 per  cent  of public  sector  work-
ers in the sample  reside in regional  urban  centres  as opposed to  the  capital
city.  The  proportion  is even lower at  24 per  cent  for private  sector worker.
The  public sector figure is broadly  consistent  with the  division of the urban
population  in Ethiopia  between regional  urban  centres  and  the capita:L.
Of all of the  variables  in  Xi,  on]ly the  industry  dummies,  FOODBEV,
OTHMANU  and OTHINDUS  are excluded from the  Zli and  Z2 i of the struc-
tural  probits.  The inclusion of the remaining variables in the exogenous vari-
ables, Zli,  of the  IQ functions is based  on the possibility  that  age, gender,
tenure,  occupation  and residence  may  all be  expressions  of variation  in at-
titudes  to  risk or taste  vis-a-vis other job  attributes  and,  consequently,  are
not  necessarily  fully captured  by contemporaneous  wage differentials.  The
inclusion of the  same variables  in the  exogenous variables,  Z2i, of the  CFQ
function  can be justified  in similar  terms:  for a  given wage structure,  em-
ployers may prefer a particular  age, gender, education  or experience group to
others  either  because non-wage costs of employment or productivity  or both
happen to vary with the same variables while the location and nature  of pub-
lic sector activities  may result in the predominance  of certain occupations  or
locations in the distribution  of public sector jobs.  It is possible that  the effect
of schooling on worker sectoral preferences or non-wage employment  costs or
productivity  is non-linear.  I therefore  include the  variable EDUCSQ,  which
is defined as the  square of EDUC, in both  Zli  and  Z2i
Apart  form EDUCSQ,  Zli includes three other variables that  are excluded
from  both  Xi  and  Z2i.  These  are  all  dichotomous  indicators  of paternal
occupation  and  are defined as follows:
17FATPUWAG  =  1 if the  worker's  father  works  or  worked  mainly  as  a
public sector employee;
FATPRWAG  =  1 if the  worker's  father  works  or worked  mainly  as  an
employee of a private  firm; and
FATOWNAC=1  if the worker's father  works or worked mainly  as a non-
farm own-account  worker.
The  base  group  for the  definition  of these  variables  are workers whose
fathers  mainly  work or worked  as  traditional  farmers.  More  than  60 per
cent of workers in the  sample  belong to  this  group,  or are first  generation
urban  dwellers, which is a reflection of the  very recent  nature  of urbanisa-
tion  in Ethiopia.  Approximately  a fifth of the  sample  have or had  fathers
who worked in the  urban  private  sector  as wage employees or own-account
workers.  Fathers  of a  similar  proportion  of the  sample  were  public  sector
workers. The hypothesis  is that  family background  as indicated  by paternal
occupation  influences the attitude  of workers to  particular  attributes  of jobs
on offer.'2 A possible justification  for this  is that  parents  values  and  atti-
tudes  may somehow be passed down to children in their  upbringing.  On the
other  hand  the highly  centralised  nature  of vacancy  advertisement  and  the
screening of job applicants  in Ethiopia's  public sector suggests that  the same
variables  are unlikely to  have a significant influence on wage determination
or the probability  of an individual being selected from a possible job queue.'3
Hence the  exclusion of paternal  occupation  variables from Z 2 i  as well as from
xi.
3.2  Estimates  of Reduced  Form IQ  and  CFQ  Probits
I report  in Table  3.2 maximum likelihood estimates  of the  parameters  of the
reduced  form  selection rules  of the  queue model.  Corresponding  estimates
of the  selection  rule  of the  no-queue  model  are  given in  columns  1 and  2
of Table  3.3, while those  of the  selection rule of the  universal-queue  model
are reported  in columns 3 and  4 of the same table.  The log likelihood ratio
of Abowd  and  Farber's  test  of the no-queue  model is 73.8 at  14 degrees of
freedom which compares to  a critical  value of 33.4 at the  one per  cent  level
12The use of maternal occupation as an indicator of family background is not possi-
ble because of lack of variation in the empolment status of mothers.  An extremly high
proportion reported that  their mothers were mainly housewives.
13A more detailed comparison of the job-matching process in the public sector with that
of the private sector is given in Chapter 7 in relation to manufacturing industries.
18Table  2:  Maximum  Likelihood Estimates  of the  Sorting  Probit;s of the  Re-
duced Form Job Queue Model.
Variable  IQ Function  CFQ Function
Coefficient  Standard  Coefficient  Standard
error  error
Constant  1.5442  0.6155  -1.609  0.2628
EDUC  0.1483  0.0654  -0.01116  0.0821
EDUCSQ  -0.0099  0.0035  0.0135  0.0058
EXPR  -0.0379  0.0254  0.01654  0.0034
EXPRSQ  -0.0003  0.0004  0.0013  0.0011
TENURE  0.0673  0.0303  0.1619  0.0365
TENURESQ  -0.001  0.0009  -0.0036  0.0016
GENDER  -0.2264  0.1842  -0.6978  0.1588
FATPRWAG  -1.2762  0.2816
FATPUWAG  0.2499  0.2433
FATOWNAC  -0.25  0.2311
ADMCLER  -0.2254  0.2634  -0.002  0.2159
PROFTECH  -0.0963  0.2309  0.5107'  0.2535
FOODBEV  -0.4603  0.3742  0.4126  0.5247
OTHMANU  -0.2576  0.2462  -0.5588  0.201
OTHINDUS  -0.833  0.2321  -0.1796  0.2819
NONADDIS  0.8418  0.1932  0.34  0.1648
Log likelihood  -522.67
Number of observations  1170
of significance.  The universal-queue  model is as easily rejected  by the  same
test  with  a likelihood ratio  of 96 at  17 degrees of freedom.
It should be noted that  the estimates  reported  in columns 1 and 2 of Table
3.3 are always correct  as a description  of the determination  of the probability
of a worker having  a public sector job  regardless of whether  or not  the  no-
queue model accurately  describes the sorting mechanism between private  and
public  sector jobs.  The validity or otherwise of the no-queue model matters
only in the  interpretation  of the  same probability.  If the  no-queue model  is
accepted  as the correct  description  of the allocation  of workers between the
two sectors,  then the  probability  of having a public sector job is the same as
the  probability  of wanting the same job.  The latter  is not,  of course, correct
if the no-queue model is rejected  in favour of the  queue model.  Since this  is,
19Table  3:  Maximum Likelihood Estimates  of Sorting Probits  of the Reduced
Form No-queue and  Uniiversal Queue Models.
Variable  No-queue Model  Universal Queue Model
Coefficient  Standard  Coefficient  Standard
error  error
Constant  -1.3981  0.1948  -1.5  0.1898
EDUC  0.1694  0.0383  0.1622  0.0376
EDUCSQ  -0.0041  0.0023  -0.0038  0.0022
EXPR  0.0217  0.0118  0.0259  0.0117
EXPRSQ  -0.0004  0.0002  -0.0004  0.0002
TENURE  0.1325  0.0158  0.1326  0.0158
TENURESQ  -0.0030  0.0005  -0.0029  0.0005
GENDER  -0.5449  0.0969  -0.5245  0.0950
FATPRWAG  -0.7860  0.1843
FATPUWAG  -0.0734  0.1223
FATOWNAC  -0.1740  0.1323
ADMCLER  -0.0691  0.1227  -0.0751  0.1218
PROFTECH  0.2331  0.1278  0.2162  0.1266
FOODBEV  0.0385  0.2122  0.0330  0.2078
OTHMANU  -0.3011  0.1171  -0.3289  0.1160
OTHINDUS  -0.5185  0.1393  -0.5108  0.1375
NONADDIS  0.6395  0.1393  0.6535  0.0980
Log-likelihood  -559.56  -570.72
Number of observations  1170  1170
20in fact, the case, we should read columns 1 and 2 of the table  as nothing more
than  a description  of the  determination  of the probability  of a worker being
found in the public sector.  Table 3.2 then tells us as to how the influence of a
given variable on the same probability  divides into a component  transmitted
through  the IQ probability  and one transmitted  through  the CFQ probability.
It is thus possible that  a variable which has a strong influence on one of the IQ
or CFQ probabilities  appears  not to  affect at all the  probability  of a worker
actually being found in the public sector simply because its effect countervails
the effect on the other probability.  On the other  hand,  a variable that  shows
up as a strong influence on the  probability  of public sector employment  may
bear no relationship  to one of the IQ probability  or to the  CFQ  probability.
Thus  we see from Table 3.2 that  women are more likely to  have a public
sector job than  men not because they  are more likely to prefer public sector
employment, but because, among those that  do have such preference, they are
more likely to  be selected by public sector employers.  Similarly, professional
or technical  workers are more  likely to  be  found  in the  public  sector  than
other  occupational  groups,  not  because  they  are more likely  to choose the
same sector, but  because  they  are more likely to  be chosen from the public
sector job  queue.  On the  other  hand,  a wage-employee in  a regional  urban
centre  is more likely to be found in the public sector than  a similar worker in
Addis Ababa  both  because regional workers are more likely to  prefer public
sector employment and because the same group of workers are more likely to
be  selected by the  public sector.  Likewise, industrial  workers are less likely
to  be public  sector  employees than  service workers, both  because  they  are
less  likely to  choose public  sector jobs  and  because  public  sector  demand
for such workers is lower.  A similar  decomposition  cannot  be  made  of the
influence of family background  on the probability  of a worker's public sector
employment,  since the  corresponding  variables  are excluded  from  the  CFQ
function  as  a means of identifying  the  parameters  of both  functions.  In as
far as this  exclusion is valid, I interpret  the results  reported  in the  table  as
indicative  of a significant influence of family background  on choice of sector.
This is in the sense that  workers whose father's  are or were in private  sector
wage or non-farm self-employment  are less likely to  prefer public sector jobs
than  workers whose paternal  occupation  was traditional  farming.
Turning  to  the effect of conventional  human  capital  variables,  we should
note that  the variable TENURE,  in the present context  is an indicator  of job
security  from the  point  of view of workers and  firm-specific experience from
the  point  of view of employers.  Because the  mean  public  sector job tenure
21Table  4:  Probabilities  of IQ  and  CFQ  Status  as  Functions  of Schooling,
Reduced Form Job  Queue Model
(Standard  errors in parentheses.)
Years of  IQ status  CFQ status  Public sector employment
Schooling  Probability  Marginal  Probability  Marginal  Probability  Marginal
effect  effect  effect
1  0.9062  0.0249  0.0105  -0.0003  0.026  0.0102
(0.1142)  (0.0285)  (0.0083)  0.0024  (0.0124)  (0.0033)
6  0.9679  0.0021  0.0293  0.01  0.1411  0.0268
(0.0432)  (0.0039)  (0.0195)  0.0060  (0.0354)  (0.0056)
8  0.9692  -0.0007  0.0622  0.0250  0.1970  0.0287
(0.0391)  (0.0018)  (0.0353)  0.0287  (0.0434)  (0.0066)
12  0.9692  -0.0062  0.3068  0.1096  0.1970  0.0195
(0.3049)  (0.0053)  (0.0891)  0.0274  (0.0415)  (0.0066)
16  0.8757  -0.0346  0.8311  0.1058  0.3856  0.0142
(0.0945)  (0.0224)  (0.1093)  0.0277  (0.0719)  (0.0561)
*  Base group characteristics: a male worker residing in the capital with no
market experience, no current job tenure, a traditional farmer as a father and
employed in a non-professional,  non-technical  job in the services industry
is twice the figure for the private  sector, workers attaching  greater  weight to
job security are more likely to prefer the public sector, while the public sector
would prefer workers with more in-house experience.  I therefore  expect  both
the IQ  and  CFQ  probabilities  to  increase  with  tenure  over the  current  job,
which  is what  we see in  Table  3.2.  However, we also see that  the  impact
of the  same variable  on the  probability  of having a public  sector job occurs
more through  the  CFQ probability  than  through  the IQ probability.
The effects of education  and market  experience on the IQ and CFQ func-
tions  is analysed  in Tables 3.4 and 3.5.  The base group  used for computing
results  of Table  3.4 consists of male  workers residing in Addis with  negligi-
ble market  experience,  negligible tenure  over the  current  job,  a  traditional
farmer  as a father  and  employed in  a non-professional,  non-technical,  non-
administrative  job  in a service industry.  The  base  group used  for the  com-
putation  of Tables  3.5 consists of workers with  9 years  of schooling and  a
variable market  experience but  otherwise having the  same characteristics  as
the base group of Tables 2.4. Following Abowd and Farber,  it can be argued
that  if public  sector wage rates  are  more standardised  or compressed  than
22Table 5:  Probabilities  of IQ and  CFQ  Status  as Functions  of Market  Expe-
rience, Reduced Form Job  Queue Model.
(Standard  errors in parentheses)
IQ status  CFQ status  Public sector
Experience  employment
(years)  Probability  Marginal  Probability  Marginal  Probabil:ity
effect  effect
0  0.9678  -0.0027  0.0935  0.0028  0.2257
(0.0396)  (0.0022)  (0.0466)  (0.0049)  (0.0465)
5  0.9507  -0.0042  0.1145  0.0058  0.2566
(0.0494)  (0.0030)  (0.0372)  (0.0042)  (0.0409)
10  0.9246  -0.0063  0.1538  0.0103  0.2832
(0.0625)  (0.0039)  (0.0416)  (0.0042)  (0.0397)
15  0.9246  -0.0068  0.1538  0.0134  0.3045
(0.0582)  (0.0038)  (0.0446)  (0.0046)  (0.0470)
20  0.8469  -0.0122  0.2355  0.0216  0.3198
(0.1006)  (0.0057)  (0.0946)  (0.0066)  (0.0448)
Note: Base group characteristics: a male worker residing in the capital with 9
years of schooling,  no current job tenure, a traditional farmer as a fathei and
employed in a non-professional,  non-technical job in the services industry
23private  sector rates,  either  because  of the  greater  degree  of unionisation  of
public  sector jobs  or  as a matter  of a  centralised  public  sectbr  pay  policy,
then  a person's  desire for a public  sector job  should  diminish  with  the per-
son's  skill as measured  by schooling or the  level of market  experience.  On
the other  hand,  since the  same compression of rates  amounts  to  a lowering
of the relative  price  of higher grades  of skill, its effect on a cost  minimising
public sector  employer is to  make the  employer recruit  more skilled workers
than  the private  sector  as long as technology  is one of substantial  elasticity
of substitution  between  skill grades.  In  other  words,  we expect  the  CFQ
function  to  increase  in schooling and  experience  while the  IQ  function  de-
creases in both.  This,  indeed, is what  the data  suggest.  For instance,  we see
from columns  1 and  3 of Table 3.4 that  practically  everyone with  8 years of
schooling or less in the base group is in the queue for public sector jobs, while
the probability  of being selected from the  queue is substantial  only for those
with  8 years or more of schooling. The result  comes out even more forcefully
in the second and fourth  colums of the same table,  where the marginal  effect
of schooling on the  IQ probability  is almost  zero for those  with  less than
12 years  of schooling and  negative  for those  with  12 years  or more educa-
tion.  In  contrast,  the  marginal  effect of schooling on the  CFQ  probability
is positive  and  significant for those  with  6 years  of schooling or more.  The
picture  is more or  less the  same when  it  comes to  the  influence of market
experience.  Here  also, practically  every one  with  15 years  of experience  or
less is in the  queue, while the  probability  of being chosen from the queue is
substantial  only  for those  with  more than  15 years  of experience  as can be
seen from  the  first  and  third  columns of Table  3.5.  This  translates  to  the
result,  in the  second and fourth  columns, that  the marginal  effect of market
experience on the  IQ probability  is practically  zero for those  with  below  15
years of experience while the marginal effect of the same variable on the CFQ
probability  is positive,  significant, and  increasing  for those  with  10 years or
more of experience.
3.3  Estimated  Wage  Equations
The  least  squares  estimates  of the  sectoral  wage equations  are  reported  in
Table  3.6.  As  can be seen  from the  table  the  goodness of fit of the  public
sector equation  is quite high by the standards  of estimates  reported  for both
developed  and  developing economies.  The fit of the private  sector equation
is not  as good, but  is also comparable  to those reported  in, for example, Lin-
24dauer and Sabot  (1983), Terrel (1993) and Hartog  and Oosterbeek  (1993). In
both  cases, the  coefficients or the human  capital  variables  are highly signifi-
cant, have the expected signs and imply a strictly  concave experience-earning
and tenure-earning  profiles.  The coefficients of education  are comparable  in
magnitude  to  those  reported  by Gyourko and  Tracy  (1988) and  Bjorklund
and  Moffit  (1987).  The  magnitudes  of the  coefficients of tJhe market  ex-
perience  variables  are similar  to  those  reported  in  Robinson  and  Tommes
(1984), Lindauer  and Sabot  (1983), Gyourko and  Tracy  (1988), Hartog  and
Oosterbeek  (1993) and Terrel  (1993). We also see that  the  rate  of return  to
schooling is higher in the public sector while the experience-earnings  and the
tenure-earnings  profiles are steeper in the private sector.  The second of these
results  is in  contradiction  to  that  reported  by Lindauer  and  Sabot  (1983)
for Tanzania  but  is consistent  with that  reported  by Van der  Gaag  and Vi-
jverberg  (1988) for Cote d'Ivoire.  The industry  dummies  are not  significant
in either  wage equation  with the  exception  that  for the  food and  beverages
industries  for which wages are significantly lower for comparable  workers in
the private  sector.  Somewhat surprisingly,  women on average earn  less than
otherwise comparable  men in the public  sector,  while it is not  evident  that
there  is gender wage differential in the private  sector.  Location  is also a sig-
nificant influence on public sector earnings while wages in the private  sector
do not  appear  to  vary  between  the  capital  city and  regional  towns.  Wages
do vary by occupation  in both  sectors,  professional and technical  workers al-
ways earning higher than  workers of otherwise similar characteristics  in other
occupations.  Non-professional  administrative  and  clerical workers also seem
to  enjoy a wage premium  in the  public  sector, which is not  the  case in the
private  sector.
Estimates  of conditional  wage equations  corresponding  to the  job  queue
model are reported  in Table 3.7, which shows that  the  OLS estimates  of the
wage equations  of both sectors are subject  to significant bias arising from self-
selectivity  or employer  selectivity.  Both  selectivity  terms  are  significant in
the adjusted  public sector conditional wage equation.  And, although  there is
no evidence of self-selectivity bias in the OLS estimates  of the private  sector
wage equation,  employer-selectivity bias is evident.  The null of no selectivity
bias  is rejected  for each  equation  at  the  five per  cent  level of significance.
Despite  the  bias  in  the  unadjusted  least  square  estimates  the  signs of the
same estimates  are reproduced  in those  of the adjusted  estimates.  The main
implication  of selectivity  bias is that  the  rate  of return  to  human  capital  in
general and education  in particular  is grossly overestimated  by OLS squares
25Table  6:  OLS Estimates  of Sectoral  Wage Equations,  Public  and  Private
Sectors.
Variable  Public Sector  Private Sector
Coefficient  Standard Error  Coefficient  Standard Error
Constant  -1.0185  0.1052  -0.9417  0.1477
EDUC  0.0855  0.0072  0.0740  0.0110
EXPR  0.0185  0.0066  0.01749  0.0097
EXPRSQ  -0.0003  0.0001  -0.0001  0.0002
TENURE  0.0253  0.0079  0.0508  0.0157
TENURESQ  -0.0001  0.0003  -0.0008  0.0005
GENDER  0.0813  0.0436  -0.0709  0.0994
PROFTECH  0.4704  0.0551  0.5207  0.1408
ADMCLER  0.2295  0.0562  0.1195  0.1251
FOODBEV  -0.0797  0.1001  -0.5056  0.2177
OTHMANU  -0.0176  0.060  -0.0521  0.1125
OTHINDUS  0.1292  0.0809  0.0791  0.1140
NONADDIS  0.0978  0.04192  0.0623  0.1128
R  2  0.48  0.27
Adj. R2 0.47  0.25
Number of observations  739  431
26estimates.
The estimated  value of the proportion  of private  sector workers who have
been rationed  out of the  public sector is 0.849. It  is therefore  not  surprising
that  the  no-queue model is rejected  by the  J-test.  However, I cannot  reject
the universal-queue  model on the  basis of the  same test.  Indeed,  estimates
of the  conditional  wage equation  of either  sector obtained  under  the  queue
model  and  as  reported  in  Table  3.7  are practically  the  same  as those  ob-
tained  under  the  restriction  of a universal job-queue  (Table  3.10).  On the
other  hand,  estimates  obtained  under  the  no-queue  model  (Table  3.8)  are
fairly  close to  the  unadjusted  least  squares  estimates  for either  sector.  It
is important  to  note that  the selectivity  regressors used in the  estimation  of
the conditional  wage equations  under the alternative  no-queue and universal-
queue restrictions  as reported  in Tables 3.8 and 3.10 are based on estimates
of the  reduced  form parameters  of the  general  bivariate  specification  of the
switching probit  as reported  in Table 3.2. Some loss of efficiency is therefore
bound  to  result  in either  case should  the  no-queue  or the  umiversal-queue
models be in fact correct.  If the no-queue model were not  rejected  more effi-
cient estimates  of the coefficients of the unconditional  wage equations  would
be provided by Table 3.9. Likewise if the simple probit universal  queue spec-
ification were not  rejected  more efficient estimates  of the  coefficients of the
unconditional  wage equations  would be provided  by columns Table 3.11.
The selectivity  bias of OLS estimates  of coefficients of the  unconditional
sectoral  wage  functions  naturally  translates  to  a bias  in the  OLS estimate
of the  pure  sectoral  mean  wage differential.  Following Gyourko  and  rlacy
(1988) I distinguish between the unconditional  and the conditional  pure mean
wage differentials.  The first of these is the mean of expected  earnings  differ-
entials on which workers base their  sector preference.  It  therefore  disregards
selection effects in the determination  of actual or conditional  wages. The con-
ditional mean differential in contrast  is based on the relative earning position
of a worker once the sector of employment of the worker has been determined.
It differs from the unconditional  mean differential in as far as selection effects
are due to differences in rates of return  to unobservable worker characteristics
rather  than  due to differences in levels of the same characteristics.  Let X  be
the population  mean vector of observed worker and industry  characteristics.
Since I am assuming that  wages are distributed  log normal the unconditional
mean wage differential is given by
DIF1 = exp [X (1-  2) +  2 (  v-  - V2)]-1  (31)
27Table  7:  Selectivity  Adjusted  Least  Squares  Estimates  of Sectoral  Wage
Equations,  Job  Queue Model.
Variable  Public Sector  Private Sector
Coefficient  Standard Error  Coefficient  Standard Error
Constant  -0.69  0.1783  -0.7146  0.4136
EDUC  0.0689  0.0094  0.0030  0.0217
EXPR  0.0175  0.0066  0.0233  0.0107
EXPRSQ  -0.0005  0.0002  -0.0010  0.0003
TENURE  0.0152  0.01  0.0154  0.0255
TENURESQ  0.0003  0.0003  -0.0006  0.0006
GENDER  0.1221  0.0479  0.1839  0.1240
PROFTECH  0.4226  0.0573  0.2011  0.1589
ADMCLER  0.2015  0.0575  0.0473  0.1253
FOODBEV  -0.1445  0.1020  -0.6211  0.2191
OTHMANU  -0.0182  0.0613  0.2229  0.1398
OTHINDUS  0.0698  0.0904  0.1224  0.1413
NONADDIS  0.1255  0.0528  -0.0656  0.1436
Oliv,  0.2835  0.1619
0.0551  0.1789
U2v  -0.2832  0.1153
61  0.0468  0.2490
62  -0.5498  0.1463
R  2  0.48  0.30
Adj.  R2 0.47  0.27
Number of observations  739  431
28Table  8:  Selectivity  Adjusted  Least  Squares  Estimates  of  Sectoral  Wage
Equations,  No-queue Restrictions  with Bivariate  Sorting  Probit.
Variable  Public Sector  Private Sector
Coefficient  Standard Error  Coefficient  Standard Error
Constant  -1.0429  0.1061  -0.5332  0.2776
EDUC  0.08376  0.0072  0.0733  0.0109
EXPR  0.0186  0.0066  0.0133  0.01
EXPRSQ  -0.0004  0.0002  -0.0002  0.0002
TENURE  0.0292  0.0082  0.0587  0.0163
TENURESQ  -0.0001  0.0003  -0.0009  0.0005
GENDER  0.0737  0.0438  -0.0962  0.1002
PROFTECH  0.4493  0.0564  0.4867  0.1418
ADMCLER  0.2074  0.0577  0.008  0.1269
FOODBEV  -0.1058  0.1012  -0.5868  0.2222
OTHMANU  -0.0372  0.0610  -0.0908  0.1144
OTHINDUS  0.061  0.0906  -0.0449  0.1343
NONADDIS  0.1494  0.0521  0.1952  0.1279
O1iv1  0.2691  0.1624
O'1V2  0.1979  0.1140
R  2  0.48  0.27
Adj. R2 0.47  0.25
Number of observations  739  431
29Table  9:  Selectivity  Adjusted  Least  Squares  Estimates  of  Sectoral  Wage
Equations,  No-queue Model, Univariate  Sorting  Probit.
Variable  Public Sector  Private Sector
Coefficient  Standard Error  Coefficient  Standard Error
Constant  -1.3301  0.2446  -0.9378  0.1480
EDUC  0.096  0.0103  0.0814  0.0186
EXPR  0.0213  0.0069  0.0198  0.0108
EXPRSQ  -0.0004  0.0001  -0.0002  0.0002
TENURE  0.0386  0.0123  0.0603  0.0249
TENURESQ  -0.0004  0.0003  -0.001  0.0007
GENDER  0.0341  0.0549  -0.1089  0.1262
PROFTECH  0.476  0.0552  0.5419  0.1474
ADMCLER  0.2184  0.0567  0.1160  0.1254
FOODBEV  -0.0672  0.1004  -0.5112  0.2182
OTHMANU  -0.0389  0.0618  -0.0755  0.1222
OTHINDUS  0.0782  0.0885  0.04715  0.1314
NONADDIS  0.1539  0.0578  0.1085  0.1395
O'ivl  0.2276  0.1614
(J1V2  -0.1263  0.2578
R2  0.48  0.27
Adj. R 2 0.47  0.25
Number of observations  739  431
30Table 10:  Selectivity Adjusted Least Squares Estimates of Sectoral Wage
Equations, Universal-queue  Restrictions with Bivariate Sorting Probit.
Variable  Public Sector  Private  Sector
Coefficient  Standard  Error  Coefficient  Standard  Error
Constant  -0.6734  0.1783  -0.7137  0.1547
EDUC  0.0712  0.0093  0.0009  0.0205
EXPR  0.0174  0.0066  0.0234  0.0096
EXPRSQ  -0.0004  0.0001  -0.001  0.0003
TENURE  0.0114  0.0098  -0.0187  0.0227
TENURESQ  0.0003  0.0003  0.0006  0.0006
GENDER  0.1288  0.0478  0.1959  0.1165
PROFTECH  0.4454  0.0559  0.1977  0.1582
ADMCLER  0.2248  0.056  0.0514  0.1238
FOODBEV  -0.1161  0.1009  -0.6105  0.2150
OTHMANU  0.0017  0.0603  0.2351  0.1299
OTHINDUS  0.1413  0.0808  0.1468  0.1130
NONADDIS  0.0721  0.0431  -0.0891  0.1071
072vi  -0.2759  0.1153
a0  2V2 -0.5658  0.1353
R  2  0.48  0.30
Adj. R2 0.47  0.28
Number  of observations  739  431
31Table  11:  Selectivity  Adjusted  Least  Squares  Estimates  of Sectoral  Wage
Equations,  Universal Queue Model with  Univariate  Sorting  Probit.
Variable  Public Sector  Private Sector
Coefficient  Standard Error  Coefficient  Standard Error
Constant  -2.089  0.3008  -0.9224  0.1488
EDUC  0.1210  0.0117  0.1031  0.0303
EXPR  0.0286  0.0071  0.0259  0.0127
EXPRSQ  -0.0005  0.0001  -0.0003  0.0002
TENURE  0.0704  0.0142  0.0881  0.0395
TENURESQ  -0.0011  0.0004  -0.0016  0.0009
GENDER  -0.0805  0.0607  -0.2187  0.1747
PROFTECH  0.4918  0.0549  0.6025  0.1616
ADMCLER  0.1974  0.0563  0.0965  0.1271
FOODBEV  -0.0546  0.0993  -0.5022  0.2177
OTHMANU  -0.0883  0.0623  -0.1461  0.1449
OTHINDUS  -0.0469  0.0926  -0.0437  0.1650
NONADDIS  0.2920  0.0659  0.2372  0.1986
02vi  -0.7614  0.2007
12V2  -0.4834  0.4698
R  2  0.49  0.27
Adj. R2 0.48  0.25
Number of observations  739  431
32Table 12: Estimates  of the Mean Public  Sector Wage Premium  Under Alter-
native  Assumptions  About  Sample Selection.
Model  Mean Public Sector Wage Premium (%)
Unconditional  Conditional
No Sample Selection  -21.4
Job Queue Model  39.2  10.9
No queue Model  :40.1  -20.1
Universal Queue Model  64.9  14.2
To obtain the corresponding conditional differential we add terms of selection
effects evaluated  at the population  mean to the bracketed  terms  of equation
3.1.  Thus  the  expression  for the  conditional  mean  wage difl-erential of the
queue model is
DIF2  exp[X  (f1-2)  +  2 (av  -2)  +  clTAl  t  2 v2 A2
-(u1v2 A3 +  61A1 +  52A 4)]-1  (32)
where AZ is the population  mean of )ji,  j  =  1,..., 4 and )1  is the population
mean  of A1i
The queue model implies that  the unconditional  mean wage of the public
sector is nearly  1.4 times the unconditional  mean  wage of the  private  sector
(Table 3.12). However, the conditional  mean public sector wage premium  is
much lower at  11 per  cent.  Both  differentials sharply  contrast  with  the  21
per cent unconditional  mean private sector wage premium we would get if we
suppressed the  problem of sample selection altogether.  The no-queue model
actually  magnifies the bias in the estimated  mean differential implying a pri-
vate sector unconditional  premium  of more than  40 per cent and conditional
premium  of 20 per  cent.  As  is to  be  expected  the  mean  wage  differential
obtained  under  the  universal  queue restriction  is quite  close to  that  of the
general model implying a public sector unconditional  premiura  of 65 per cent
and  conditional  premium  of 14.2 per cent.
333.4  Estimates  of Structural  IQ  and  CFQ  Probits
Maximum likelihood estimates  of the structural  sorting  probits  of the  queue
model are presented  in Table 3.13 while those  of the  no-queue and  universal
queue models are given in  Table  3.14.  The  most  remarkable  of the  results
of the  estimation  of the  no-queue  model  is that  the  public  versus  private
sector  wage differential  is not  a significant influence on the  sectoral  choice
of workers.  A similar  result  is reported  by  Van der  Gaag  and  Vijverberg
(1987) who estimated  the  same model for Cote d'Ivoire.  Van der Gaag  and
Vijverberg seem to explain their finding as a consequence of non-wage benefits
being a high proportion  of the compensation  package of public sector workers.
Gill (1988) reports  a similar result  in a slightly different context  and  argues
that  the  finding may be because  contemporaneous  wage differentials  poorly
proxy for expected  lifetime earning  differentials.  My estimates  of the  queue
model  point  to  a  more  immediate  explanation  than  either  of these:  that
the  no-queue  model  is a misspecification  of the  actual  sorting  mechanism.
According to the estimated  queue model the public-private  wage differential
is, in fact, 'the  single most important  factor'  in the determination  of workers'
sector preferences.  We do not  read  the  same result  from the  estimation  of
the  no-queue model simply because the procedure  leads to  biased estimates
of the  differential.  Parameter  estimates  of the  universal  queue model  are
broadly  similar  to  those  of CFQ  function  of the queue model.  However, by
construction  the universal  queue model implies that  worker preferences and,
hence, sectoral  wage differentials, play  no part  in the  allocation  of workers
between the  two sectors.  This  is a restriction  on the  queue  model that  we
were unable to reject on the basis of the J-test  for a queue.  However, we have
rejected the same restriction  based on Abowd and Farber's  test  applied to the
reduced  form sorting  probits.  Abowd and  Farber's  test  for a job  queue can
also conducted  on the basis of estimates  of the structural  probits  and  again
leads to a rejection of the universal queue model in favour of the queue model.
The log likelihood of the universal queue model is -572.2 which compares  to
a log-likelihood of -528.4 for the queue model.
Focusing on parameter  estimates  of the queue model, we see from Table
3.13 that,  once we control  for  expected  sectoral  wage  differentials,  family
background  as indicated  by paternal  employment  status  is the strongest  in-
fluence on a worker's desire for a public sector job.  It is followed by gender,
location  of residence  and human  capital  in that  order  of importance.  FRom
the recruitment  point of view, the wage a worker would command  as a public
34Table  13:  Maximum  Likelihood Estimates  of Structural  Parameters  of the
Job Queue Model.
Variable  IQ Function  CFQ Function
Coefficient  Standard Error  Coefficient  Standard Error
Constant  -1.7141  0.2455  -0.5566  0.9793
InW 1i-lnW 2 i  1.1044  0.4346
XJ3 1 + &1 , 1 ,Al  -4.1109  1.0206
EDUC  -0.04623  0.0783  0.3537  0.0930
EDUCSQ  0.0098  0.0050  -0.0053  0.0038
EXPR  0.0298  0.0275  0.0311  0.0368
EXPRSQ  0.0002  0.0009  -0.0020  0.0006
TENURE  0.1346  0.0322  0.0659  0.0380
TENURESQ  -0.0036  0.0014  0.0015  0.0011
GENDER  -0.6045  0.1464  0.4664  0.2615
FATPRWAG  -0.6875  0.2321
FATPUWAG  -0.080  0.1632
FATOWNAC  -0.3314  0.1902
ADMCLER  -0.1840  0.2057  0.7205  0.3864
PROFTECH  0.2125  0.2275  1.7124  0.5225
NONADDIS  0.2317  0.1601  0.9504  0.2118
Log likelihood  -528.42
Number of observations  1170
35Table  14:  Maximum  Likelihood Estimates  of the  Structural  Parameters  of
the  No-queue and  Universal Queue Models.
Variable  No-queue Model  Univeral-queue  Model
Coefficient  Standard Error  Coefficient  Standard Error
Constant  -1.4755  0.2597  7.1782  2.6327
In Wli  - ln W2i  0.0784  0.4714
11Whi  -4.1765  1.2475
EDUC  0.1663  0.0388  -0.3381  0.1526
EDUCSQ  -0.0037  0.0022  -0.0040  0.0022
EXPR  0.0206  0.0118  -0.0925  0.0370
EXPRSQ  -0.0003  0.0002  0.0016  0.0006
TENURE  0.1326  0.0186  -0.1607  0.0883
TENURESQ  0.0030  0.0006  0.0017  0.0015
GENDER  -0.5798  0.1152  -0.2022  0.1390
FATPRWAG  -0.8153  0.1827
FATPUWAG  0.0354  0.1206
FATOWNAC  -0.1829  0.1314
ADMCLER  -0.3670  0.1293  -0.8959  0.2861
PROFTECH  0.2752  0.1326  -1.8320  0.6359
NONADDIS  0.6298  0.0990  -0.5672  0.3742
Log likelihood  -568.65  -574.73
Number of observations  1170  1170
36sector employee is the  most  important  determinant  of the  likelihood of the
worker being selected from the queue for public sector jobs:  given the public
sector's  recruitment  policy, workers on the  lower end  of the  pay scale  are
more likely to  be selected.  This  further  supports  the  hypothesis  that  pub-
lic sector  employers  are cost  minimisers,  a result  already  suggested  by the
reduced  form marginal  effects of skill variables on CFQ probabilities.
In  Tables 3.15 to  3.16 I report  estimates  of the  average  IQ probabilities
of the  base  group  at  various  levels of schooling and  market  experience.  A
comparison  of these  with  Tables  3.4 and  3.5 shows that  the  higher  average
IQ probabilities  of higher skill groups are basically a result of a;  positive cor-
relation between skill and expected sectoral  wage differential.  In the absence
of a  positive public  sector  wage premium,  the  probability  that  a worker of
any skill group prefers  public  sector employment  is negligible except  at  ex-
tremely  high  levels of schooling or experience.  On the  other  hand,  due  to
a strong  positive  correlation  between  skill and public sector  wage rates,  the
average reduced  form  CFQ probability  of a high skill group  wuderestimates
the corresponding  structural  probability.  To the extent  more skilled workers
command  higher wages, they  are less attractive  to  cost minimising  employ-
ers.  To the extent  that  higher skill means higher productivity,  the likelihood
of being selected  from  a job  queue increases  with  skill.  The  average  CFQ
probability  of a high skill group that  we calculate by fixing the public sector
wage at  a rate  that  is uniform  across skill groups must  therefore  be higher
than  the  average  probability  we obtain  on the  basis of estimates  of the  re-
duced form  CFQ  function,  in  which we cannot  control  for variation  in the
cost of employment.  That  said,  we should  note  that  the  basic implication
of the reduced  form sorting  mechanism that  the IQ probability  decreases or
is invariant with  skill while the  CFQ  probability  increases wit]h the  same, is
confirmed by estimates  of the structural  probits.  This we can see from Tables
3.15 and  3.16, where  the  marginal  effects of education  and  market  experi-
ence on the IQ probability  are not  statistically  different from zero except  at
the  extreme  schooling or experience  levels. In contrast,  the  marginal  effects
of the  same  variables  on the  CFQ  probability  are positive,  significant  and
generally increasing.
Another  major  point of difference between the information  content  of the
reduced  form  and  structural  sorting  probits  of the  queue  model  concerns
the  role of gender  in the  IQ  and  CFQ  functions.  As  pointed  out  earlier,
my estimates  of reduced form parameters  imply that  although  women are no
more likely to prefer public sector employment than  men, they  [lave a greater
37Table  15:  Probabilities  of IQ  and  CFQ  Status  as  Functions  of Schooling,
Structural  Job  Queue Model.
(Standard  errors in parentheses)
Schooling  IQ at Zero Expected Wage Premium  CFQ at Mean Public Sector Wage
(years)  Probability  Marginal Effect  Probability  Marginal Effect
0  0.0102  -0.0013  0.0094  0.0089
(0.0074)  (0.0025)  (0.0331)  (0.0260)
6  0.0125  0.0023  0.3379  0.1062
(0.0103)  (0.0024)  (0.3550)  (0.0313)
8  0.0197  0.0053  0.5564  0.1064
(0.0167)  (0.0047)  (0.3423)  (0.0405)
12  0.0197  0.0091  0.8719  0.0476
(0.0193)  (0.0089)  (0.1440)  (0.0475)
16  0.2934  0.0923  0.9750  0.0108
(0.1938)  (0.0563)  (0.0370)  (0.0139)
* Base group characteristics: a male worker residing in the capital with no
market experience, no current job tenure, a traditional farmer as a father and
employed in a non-professional,  non-technical job in the service industry
38Table 16: Probabilities  of IQ and CFQ  Status  as Functions  of Market Expe-
rience,  Structural  Job Queue Model.
(Standard  errors in parentheses)
Experience  IQ at Zero Expected Wage Premium  CFQ at Mean Public Sector Wage
(years)  Probability  Marginal Effect  Probability  Marginal Effect
0  0.0262  0.0018  0.6576  0.0091
(0.0220)  (0.0013)  (0.3001)  (0.0077)
5  0.0371  0.0026  0.6953  0.0107
(0.0245)  (0.0017)  (0.2481)  (0.0067)
10  0.0525  0.0036  0.6966  0.0124
(0.0307)  (0.0022)  (0.2209)  (0.0053)
15  0.0525  0.0038  0.6966  0.0131
(0.0317)  (0.0025)  (0.2027)  (0.0047)
20  0.0964  0.0065  0.7334  0.0150
(0.0574)  (0.0041)  (0.1874)  (0.0062)
* Base group characteristics: a male worker residing in the capital with 9 years of
schooling,  no current job tenure, a traditional farmer as a father and employed in
a non-professional,  non-technical job in the services industry
39probability of being selected from the public sector job queue. According to
the first column of Table 3.13 this is the case only because we fail to control
for the influence  of wage differentials  on sector preferences  in estimating the
reduced form sorting mechanism. The estimates of the structural parameters
of the  same mechanism reveal that,  for a given sectoral wage differential,
women are, in fact more likely to choose  public sector employment than men
while, given the public sector wage rate, employers  are more likely to select
men than  women from the  public sector job queue.  In other words, that
women are not seen to have greater preference  for public sector jobs from the
reduced form estimates is a consequence  of the fact that  the public sector
wage premium is lower in their case. Similarly,  the reduced form estimates
suggest that  women have a higher probability of being selected from the
public sector job queue only because the cost of employing a female worker
is lower to public sector employers  than the cost of employing an otherwise
comparable male.
4  Summary  and  Conclusion
In this paper I have attempted to test and measure the existence  and scope of
a public sector job queue in Ethiopia's urban labour market. In order to carry
out the test  I have extended Lee's two stage structural  probit  analysis by
replacing the univariate specification  of the sorting probit by Poirier's probit
with partial observablility. The results reject the absence of job rationing
in favour of a  partial queue for public sector jobs.  The queue is largely
due to  the expectation of large public sector wage premiums the  mean of
which is estimated at 11 per cent if we ignore returns to unobservable worker
characteristics and at the hefty figure of 40 per cent otherwise.
However,  there is more to the length or the composition of the queue than
the expectation of higher public sector wages. When I control for individual
differences  in the expected public sector wage premium, family background
as indicated by the main sector of employment of the father of a worker is
the most important influence  on the worker's sector preference. Specifically,
a worker  with a traditional farming family background  is more likely  to be in
the queue than a worker who is at least a second generation urban dweller.
This is significant in view of the  recent nature of urbanisation in Ethiopia
even by African standards. It seems to suggest that  the large influx of rural
migrants to urban centres observed in the last two to three  decades in the
40country  is at least  in part  fuelled by anticipated  public  sectoi  employment.
Gender  and  location  of residence  relative  to  Addis  Ababa,  as the  political
capital  and  by  far  the  largest  urban  economy in  the  country,  are  next  in
importance  as the  determinants  of sector  preference.  On average,  women
are  more likely than  men to  prefer  public  sector jobs  while a  worker in  a
provincial  town  is more likely to  be in  the  queue for the  same jobs  than  a
worker based in the  capital.  On the other hand,  I find that  skill as indicated
by levels of schooling and market  experience is not  a significant influence on
the sector preference of a worker once we control for individual  differences in
earning  potential  in either  sector.
On the  recruitment  side,  I find  that  the  probability  of a  worker being
selected from the a public sector job queue decreases with  the wage rate  the
worker potentially  commands  as a public sector employee.  Given the public
sector's  pay  rules  and  the  composition  of workers  in  terms  of observable
characteristics,  workers on  the  lower end  of the  pay  scale  are  more  likely
to  be  selected.  This  is consistent  with  public  sector employers making  cost
minimising recruitment  decisions.  The hypothesis  of cost mirimising  public
sector employers is further supported  by the result that,  although the queuing
status  of workers is independent  of skill, more skilled workers are more likely
to  be  chosen once in the  queue.  However, I also find that  vwomen  are less
likely to  be selected than  men of comparable  observable characteristics.
None  of these  results  can  be  read  directly  from  the  estimation  of the
reduced  form  sorting  probits  as was done  for instance  in Abowd  and  Far-
ber(1982).  This  is because  reduced  form  parameters  fail to  distinguish  be-
tween the  direct  marginal  effect of a variable on the  probability  of a worker
being in the queue or being selected from it from the indirect  marginal effect
of the variable  on the  same probability  through  the variable's  effect on ex-
pected  wage rates in either  sector.  Thus  although  my estimates  of the struc-
tural  probits  suggest skill is not  a factor in the determination  of the queuing
status  of a worker, the  reduced  form estimates  imply  that  the  marginal  ef-
fect of skill on the  probability  of being in  the  queue  is, in  fact,  significant
and  negative  at  higher  levels of skill.  At  the  same time  the  reduced  form
marginal effect of skill on the probability  of being selected from the  queue is
larger than  the structural  marginal  effect. The first of these suggests that  the
expected  public  sector  wage premium  decreases  with  the  skill of a  worker.
The second suggests that  the existing public sector pay structure  lowers the
relative price of higher skill grades for public sector employers inducing them
to  'substitute  skill for numbers'.  The  reduced  form  estimates  also suggest
41that  women are no more likely to be in the pubic sector queue than  men but
are more likely to  be selected from the  queue.  Given the results  of the esti-
mation  of the structural  probit  on the matter  as reported  above, this implies
that  women expect  a lower public sector wage premium.
The  rejection  of the  no-queue  model  implies  that  a  univariate  sorting
probit  would be  a misspecification of the  allocation  of workers between  the
public and private  sectors of Ethiopia's  urban  labour market.  It  is, of course,
true  that  if  a  sorting  mechanism  can  be  accurately  described  by  Poirier's
probit,  then  it is also accurately  described  by a univariate  probit.  However,
in the presence of a job queue, a univariate  probit  specification  of the switch
between  wage regimes results  in  biased  estimates  of the  expected  sectoral
wage differential.  This  in turn  leads to  a biased estimate  of the  coefficient
of the public  sector wage premium  in the structural  probit.  It  is not  there-
fore surprising  that  some studies  based  on the  univariate  specification  have
reported  the result that  sectoral  wage differentials do not  influence choice of
sector, which is, indeed, the result that  I also get by estimating  the no-queue
model.  Although,  several  explanations  can be  put  forward  for this  rather
counter  intuitive  result,  the  estimation  of both  the queue and  the  no-queue
models suggests a readier  account  of it.
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